FOURTH DIVISION PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff,
S8-17 -CRM-0251 FOR: Violation of Section Republic Act No. 3019
- versus -
3(e),
ALFREDO O. ESTRERA CAYETANO T. PACANA IV MA. CHIRALI C. RESPONSO RIZAL C. RAMOS PATRICK S. SAGUN JOSEFINO G. SANCHEZ PEDRO R. GONZALES, Accused.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff,
S8-17 -CRM-0252 FOR: Violation of Section Republic Act No. 3019
- versus ALFREDO O. ESTRERA CAYETANO T. PACANA IV, PEDRO R. GONZALES, Accused.
3(g),
PRESENT: Quiroz, J., Chairperson Cruz, J. Jacinto, J.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x RESOLUTION
Before the Court is accused Alfredo O. Estrera, Cayetano T. Pacana IV, Rizal C. Ramos, Ma. Chirali C. Responso, and Patrick S. Sagun's MOTION TO QUASH dated March 13, 2017.1 The accused raised three grounds in support of their Motion: one, that the facts charged do not constitute an offense; two, that the criminal action or liability had been extinguished; and, lastly, with respect to accused Estrera only, on the ground of death of the accused. Further, in their SUPPLEMENTAL REPLY filed on May 23, 2017,2in response to the prosecution's SUPPLEMENTAL COMMENT/OPPOSITION dated May 2, 2017,3 the accused raised violation of their constitutional right to speedy determination of their cases.
Records, Volume Ill, pp. Records, Volume Ill, pp. Records, Volume Ill, pp.
193- 370. 389- 423. 381- 388.
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Also on record is the COMMENT/OPPOSITION of the prosecution dated March 20, 2017 and the accused's REPLY (TO THE COMMENT/OPPOSITION OF THE OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN DATED 20 MARCH 2017) dated April 11, 2017. The procedural issue raised therein having been rendered moot and academic by the issuance of the Order of the Court dated April 20, 2017, the matter on the alleged lack of compliance to Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court will no longer be discussed in the resolution of the present motion. Additionally, as some of the grounds raised by the accused would require the review of the timeline of this case, the following chronological antecedent is provided hereunder: On June 5, 2000, the Philippine Postal Corporation, Regional Office No. X of Cagayan de Oro City (PhiIPost-10) entered into a contract for the PhilPost Survey and Titling Project with Engineer Pedro R Gonzales. Sometime July 11, 2000 to September 5, 2000, an auditorial review of the contract was endeavored by the Commission on Audit, Regional Office No. 10 (COA-RO. X). It was, however, temporarily held in abeyance pending submission by PhilPost-10 of the documents required by the COA-RO. X. While the auditorial review was pending, the state auditor reviewing the case was re-assigned and State Auditor IV Avelino M. Cabarieros took over. On March 13, 2001, Auditor Cabarieros submitted his findings and denied auditorial certification as he found the contract void ab initio. On April 16, 2001, the respondents filed an appeal. A supplement to said appeal was also filed on May 21, 2001. On October 15, 2001, Auditor Cabaneros submitted a Memorandum to the Director of COA-RO. X, recommending the institution of administrative and criminal charges against the erring public officials nd Engr. Gonzales. On November 5, 2001, COA-R.O. X Director IV Jaime P. Naranjo forwarded to the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao (OMB-MIN) the Special Audit Report of Cabarieros, including all the documents pertinent thereto." On August 8, 2002, Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer (GIPO) 1IEline S. Esparagoza issued a Joint Order recommending the dismissal of the criminal and administrative complaints against the respondents on the basis of prematuritv." On August 21, 2002, the August 8, 2002 Joint Order was elevated to the Central Office for the approval of the former Acting Ombudsperson Margarito P. Gervacio, Jr.
Records, Volume I, p. 11. Records, Volume 11, pp. 134 - 138.
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Sometime in 2014, after considering the Evaluation Report dated June 30, 2014, Ombudsperson Conch ita Carpio-Morales referred back the cases to OMB-MIN for the conduct of preliminary investigation and administrative adjudication. On December 22, 2014, GIPO I Marianne M. Macayra and GIPO I Rosemil B. Bariaqa issued a Resolution recommending the filing of the appropriate Informations against respondents Estrera, Pacana, Responso, Ramos, Sagun and Gonzales for Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 and against Estrera, Pacana and Gonzales for Violation of Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019. The December 22,2014 Resolution was approved by the Ombudsman on July 23, 2015. Respondent Estrera filed a "Motion for Reconsideration" dated September 28, 2015 and received by registered mail on September 29, 2015 questioning the lapse of 13 years since the case was recommended for dismissal by its former handling prosecutor, among others. On February 11, 2016, the Office of the Ombudsman issued an Order denying Estrera's motion, pointing out that the recommendation of the former handling prosecutor as contained in the August 8, 2002 Joint Order was not approved by then Acting Ombudsman Gervacio, Jr., or his predecessor, and, therefore, had not attained finality. The Office of the Ombudsman also explained that the review of the recommendation contained in the June 30, 2014 Evaluation Report was a valid exercise of the powers of the Office of the Ombudsman. The February 11, 2016 Order was approved by Ombudsperson Conch ita Carpio-Morales on March 11, 2016. Accordingly, on February 13, 2017, Informations for Violation of Sections 3(e) and 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019 were filed against herein accused.
We now resolve.
That the Facts Charged Do Not Constitute An Offense The fundamental test in determining whether a motion to quash may be sustained on the basis of Section 3(a) of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, i.e, that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, is whether the facts, as alleged, if hypothetically admitted, will establish the essential elements of the offense as defined by the law. In S8-17-CRM-0251, the People charged the accused with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. Violation of Section 3(e) requires the concurrence of the following elements: one, that the accused is a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions, or a private person
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charged in conspiracy with the public officers; two, that the public discharge of his functions, acted with manifest partiality, evident gross inexcusable negligence, and, thre~, that such action of the resulted to undue injury to any party, including the government, private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference.
officer, in the bad faith or public officer or gave any
In SB-17-CRM-0252, the People charged the accused with violation of Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019. Violation of Section 3(g) requires the concurrence of the following elements: one, that the accused is a public officer; two that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government, aneJ'. three, that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. A look into the Information in SB-17-CRM-0251 reveals that it specifically alleges all the essential elements constituting violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019: that on or about June 18, 1999, at Cagayan de Oro City, the accused public officers, all of the PhilPost-10 and members of the Regional Task Force on the Survey and Titling of Donated Lots (Regional Task Force) and the Pre/Post Qualification, Bid and Award Committee (PBAC), while in the performance of their official functions and committing the offense in relation to their public offices, with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, conspired with each other and with accused private contractor Geodetic Engineer Pedro R. Gonzales in willfully and criminally (a) disregarding the rules on government procurement under Presidential Decree No. 1594 and awarding the contract for the PhilPost Survey and Titling Project to accused Geodetic Engineer Pedro R. Gonzales, and (b) paying the sum of P511 ,999.20 to accused Geodetic Engineer Pedro R. Gonzales despite his failure to comply with the Obligations set forth in the contract, thereby causing undue injury to the government in the said amount, to the satisfaction of the requirements of the law. Similarly, the Information in SB-17-CRM-0252 specifically alleged that on or about June 18, 1999 and November 3, 2000, at Cagayan de Oro City, accused public officers Estrera, being then the Regional Director, and Pacana, being then the Director for Operations and concurrent Chief of the Legal Affairs Section IV, both of the PhilPost-1 0, in conspiracy with accused private contractor Geodetic Engineer Pedro R. Gonzales, willfully and unlawfully entered into a contract in behalf of the government for the PhilPost Survey and Titling Project under terms that are grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government, with accused Pedro R. Gonzales being paid P511 ,999.20 despite his failure to comply w' h the obligations set forth in the contract, to the damage and prejudice of the government, thereby establishing all the essential elements constituting violation of Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019. Thus, contrary to the assertion of the accused, the Court finds the herein Informations to be sufficient iD form, in accordance with Section 6 of Rule 110,6 as well as in substance, as the prosecution was able to establish all the elements of the offenses for which the accused are charged herein.
SEC. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. - A complaint of information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party, the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed. When an offense information.
if committed
by more than one person, all of them shall be included
in the complaint
or
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That the Criminal Action Had Been Extinguished The accused-movants and the prosecution agree that the reckoning date of prescription is August 8, 2002, the date of the issuance of the Joint Order recommending the dismissal of the administrative and criminal complaints against the accused. However, the accused-movants are claiming that the period of prescription is ten (10) years and that, therefore, the crime had prescribed on August 8, 2012. The prosecution, on the other hand, claims that the period of prescription is fifteen (15) years; that the Office of the Ombudsman had until August 8, 2017 to formally charge the accused; and that the Informations, having been filed on February 13, 2017, the period to do so has not yet lapsed. The prosecution is correct that the period of prescription is fifteen (15) years, pursuant to Section 11 of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended by Batas Pambansa Big. 195.7 However, both the prosecution and the defense are mistaken in contending that the reckoning date is August 8, 2002. In this regard, Section 2 of Republic Act No. 3326 is instructive, to wit: SEC. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceeding for its investigation and punishment. The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
Applying the above provision, prescription commenced to run from October 15, 2001, the date of discovery of the violation of the law, and was tolled on November 5, 2001 upon the institution of proceedings before OMB-MIN. As a general rule, prescription commences to run from the date of the commission of the offense. However, following the blameless ignorance doctrine, in cases where the commission of the violation be not known at the time, as an exception to the general rule, the law provides that the prescriptive period begins to run from the date of discovery. Thus, in the 2011 case of Presidential Ad Hoc F. -Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto,8 the Supreme Court en anc made the following elucidation, vizThe time as to when the prescriptive period starts to run for crimes committed under Republic Act No. 3019, a special law, is covered by Act No. 3326,9[28] Section 2 of which provides that: Section commission at the time, proceedings
2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting double jeopardy.
Sec. 11. Prescription of offenses. - All offenses punishable under this Act shall prescribe in fifteen years. G.R. No. 135715, April 13, 2011, 648 SeRA 586.
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Generally, the prescriptive period shall commence to run on the day the crime is committed. That an aggrieved person entitled to an action has no knowledge of his right to sue or of the facts out of which his right arises, does not prevent the running of the prescriptive period. An exception to this rule is the blameless ignorance doctrine, incorporated in Section 2 of Act No. 3326. Under this doctrine, the statute of limitations runs only upon discovery of the fact of the invasion of a right which will support a cause of action. In other words, the courts would decline to apply the statute of limitations where the plaintiff does not know or has no reasonable means of knowing the existence of a cause of action. It was in this accord that the Court confronted the question on the running of the prescriptive period in People v. Duque which became the cornerstone of our 1999 Decision in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto (G.R. No. 130149), and the subsequent cases which Ombudsman Desierto dismissed, emphatically, on the ground of prescription too. Thus, we held in a catena of cases, that if the violation of the special law was not known at the time of its commission, the prescription_begins to run only from the discovery thereof, i.e., discovery of the unlawful...D.atureof the constitutive act or acts. Corollary, it is safe to conclude that the prescriptive period for the crime which is the subject herein, commenced from the date of its discovery in 1992 after the Committee made an exhaustive investigation. When the complaint was filed in 1997, only five years have elapsed, and, hence, prescription has not yet set in. The rationale for this was succinctly discussed in the 1999 Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, that it was well-high impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have known these crimes committed prior to the 1986 EDSA Revolution, because of the alleged connivance and conspiracy among involved public officials and the beneficiaries of the loans. In yet another pronouncement, in the 2001 Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto (G.R. No. 130817), the Court held that during the Marcos regime, no person would have dared to question the legality of these transactions. (citations omitted) supplied)
(emphasis and italics in the original)
(underlining
In Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice,10 the Supreme Court had also clarified that the institution of proceedings in the Office of the Ombudsman to s the prescriptive period and made the following pronouncement, to wit: It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December 1926, preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the law, "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment," and the prevailing rule at the time was that once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation, the prescription of the offense is halted. The historical perspective on the application of Act No. 3326 is illuminating. Act No. 3226 was approved on 4 December 1926 at a time when the function of conducting the preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was vested in the justices of the peace. Thus, the prevailing rule at the time, as shown in the cases of v. Lazada and People v. Joson, is that the prescription of the offense is tolled once a complaint is filed with the justice
u.s.
10
G.R. No. 167571, November 25, 2008, 571 SeRA 549.
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of the peace for preliminary investigation inasmuch as the filing of the complaint signifies the institution of the criminal proceedings against the accused. These cases were followed by our declaration in People v. Parao and Parao that the first step taken in the investigation or examination of offenses partakes the nature of a judicial proceeding which suspends the prescription of the offense. Subsequently, in People v. O/arte, we held that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed cannot try the case on the merits. In addition, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its actuations already represent the initial step of the proceedings against the offender, and hence, the prescriptive period should be interrupted. In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim, which involved violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) and the Intellectual Property Code (R.A. No. 8293), which are both special laws, the Court ruled that the prescriptive period is interrupted by the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation against the accused. In the more recent case of Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation, et al., the Court ruled that the nature and purpose of the investigation conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission on violations of the Revised Securities Act, another special law, is equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases, and thus effectively interrupts the prescriptive period. The following disquisition in the Interport Resources thus:
case is instructive,
While it may be observed that the term "judicial proceedings" in Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326 appears before "investigation and punishment" in the old law, with the subsequent change in set-up whereby the investigation of the charge for purposes of prosecution has become the exclusive function of the executive branch, the term "proceedings" should now be understood either executive or judicial in character: executive when it involves the investigation phase and judicial when it refers to the trial and judgment stage. With this clarification, any kind of investigative proceeding instituted against the guilty person which may ultimately lead to his prosecution should be sufficient to toll prescription. Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. A clear example would be this case, wherein petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit on 24 August 1995, well within the four (4)-year prescriptive period. He likewise timely filed his appeals and his motions for reconsideration on the dismissal of the charges against Tongson. He went through the proper channels, within the prescribed periods. However, from the time petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor (24 August 1995) up to the time the DOJ issued the assailed resolution, an aggregate period of nine (9) years had elapsed. Clearly, the delay was beyond petitioner's control. After all, he had already initiated the active prosecution of the case as early as 24 August 1995, only to suffer setbacks because of the DOJ's flip-flopping resolutions and its misapplication of Act No. 3326. Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond their control, like the
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accused's delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies. We rule and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioner's filing of his complaint-affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified the commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and thus effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under B.P. Big. 22. (citations omitted) (italics in the original) (emphasis supplied)
Only 21 days have elapsed at the time the COA-RO. X instituted the proceedings before the OMB-MIN on November 5,2001 and, hence, prescription has not yet set in.
Right to Speedy Determination of Cases Whenever an accused invokes violation of the right to speedy determination of cases, the Court will conduct a balancing test in view of the fact that, first, "speedy disposition of cases" is a rather relative and flexible concept, and, second, only delays that are unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive are prohibited by the Constitution. For this reason, the Court takes into consideration the conduct of the both the prosecution and the defense, the length of delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure of the accused to assert such right, and the prejudice caused by the delay." Based on the tirneline of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman, from the filing of the complaints against the accused on November 5, 2001, it took the said office until March 11, 2016, or 14 years and 4 months, to punctuate its preliminary investigation. This is not a case attended by any complexity that would require the Office of the Ombudsman almost 15 years of its time and resources to investigate. As a matter of fact, it only took nine (9) months for GIPO 11 Esparagoza, the officer who first handled this case, to render a recommendation. The issue of inordinate delay had been raised by accused Estrera before the Office of the Ombudsman in his Motion for Reconsideration dated September 28, 2015. Aside from the fact that it was perfunctorily brushed aside, the Office of the Ombudsman also did not squarely a ress the issue of delay in the conduct of its investigation. Neither did it espond to this issue when raised by the accused before this Court. In sum, the Court finds that the delay attendant in this case to be unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive, and that the criminal informations in SB17-CRM-0251 and SB-17-CRM-0252 must be dismissed. The Court notes the ruling of the Supreme Court in G.R No. 18816512 and G.R No. 18906313 where it held that inordinate delay in the conduct of the preliminary investigation effectively ousts the prosecution of its authority to file the Information, a ground to quash the Information under Section 3(d) of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, and that the dismissal of the case in such a situation is in order. 11 12 13
Gonzales v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 94750, July 16, 1991. People v. Sandiganbayan, First Division and Third Division, et.al. People v. Sandiganbayan, Second Division, et.a!.
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Finally, notwithstanding the ground raised for the dismissal of the cases against accused Estrera, considering that the ruling of this Court is based on the ground of inordinate delay and thus necessarily redounds to the benefit of all the accused, the Court finds no reason to further require the counsel for accused Estrera to submit proof of the death of said accused.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Quash dated March 13, 2017 is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Informations are hereby ordered QUASHED and DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED. Quezon City, Philippines, September 20,2017.
;
WE CONCUR:
BAYA
As
I
. JACINTO
cia e Justice
