Revised: 31.7.2013
Game Theory Syllabus
Information at a glance Course: Web Site: Professor: Office Hours: Lectures:
Game Theory
Marco LiCalzi (email: [email protected]) TBA See schedule below
Purpose of course. This course covers standard content for a first-year graduate-level course in noncooperative game theory. Prerequisites. You are expected to be familiar with standard material in analysis and probability at the level of the mathematical appendix in Jehle and Reny (2001). This is required summer reading. No previous formal knowledge of game theory is required, but familiarity with simple examples such as the Prisoners’ Dilemma or the Battle of Sexes is assumed. Binmore (2007) is an elegant and effective popularisation. This is recommended summer reading. Updates. For updates or more information, trust only the class webpage: http://venus.unive.it/licalzi/gamephd.html Teaching method. There will be fifteen meetings, mixing up lectures and practice sessions. Additional material is available on the class website. Examination policy. Grading is comparative. Three homework sets will be distributed, and solutions made available. Homework is going to be graded if the School provides a teaching assistant: this is likely, but not yet confirmed at this time. If there will be a teaching assistant, grading is going to be based on the final written exam (50%), four homework sets (10% each) and class participation (10%). Otherwise, it will be based on the final written exam (90%) and class participation (10%).
Reading material The textbooks for the class are Jehle and Reny (2011) [J] and Mas-Colell et alii (1995) [M]. • G.A. Jehle and P.J. Reny (2011), Advanced Microeconomic Theory, third edition, Addison-Wesley.[Chapters 7 and 9.] • A. Mas-Colell, M.D. Whinston and J.R. Green (1995), Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press. There are several alternative presentations, with different degrees of difficulty. Here are three suggestions, as well as a good source of solved exercises (available only in Italian, alas). • M. Maschler, E. Solan and S. Zamir (2013), Game Theory, Cambridge University Press. • M.J. Osborne and A. Rubinstein (1994), A Course in Game Theory, The MIT Press. • S. Tadelis (2013), Game Theory: An Introduction, Princeton University Press. • M. LiCalzi (1995), Teoria dei Giochi, Etas-Kompass. (Collection of solved exercises.) Summer reading (Required) • G.A. Jehle and P.J. Reny (2011), Advanced Microeconomic Theory, third edition, Addison-Wesley. [Chapters A1–A2.] Summer reading (Recommended) • K. Binmore (2007), Game Theory: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford University Press.
Disclaimer.
The content of the course and the exam differ from those taught in Verona.
Schedule. Pages initialed by “J” and “M” refer to Jehle and Reny (2011). Similar notation applies to other sources. The reading material for each class may overlap in content: read what you like better. Class 1 2 3 4
Day 25/11 29/11 2/12 6/12
Time 10:30-12:00 10:30-12:00 10:30-12:00 10:30-12:00
5 6 7 8
9/12 11/12 13/12 16/12
10:30-12:00 8:45-10:15 10:30-12:00 10:30-12:00
9 10
18/12 20/12
8:45-10:15 10:30-12:00
11
8/1
8:45-10:15
12 13 14
10/1 13/1 15/1
10:30-12:00 10:30-12:00 8:45-10:15
15
17/1 TBA
10:30-12:00 TBA
Topic Strategic form games Nash equilibrium Iterated dominance Static oligopoly Homework 1 Mixed strategies Extensive form games Perfect information Incomplete information Homework 1 due back Subgame perfect equilibrium Weak sequential equilibrium Homework 2 Signaling games Homework 2 due back Belief-based criteria Refinements Repeated games Homework 3 Repeated games Final exam Homework 3 due back
Reading material J305-311 J311–319 M236–245 M387–394
J325–332 J332–337 J319–325, M253–257 J337–347 J347–358, M282-288 M450–459 M292–296 J358-364, M258–261, M288–301 M417–423
