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DiscussionPaper
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EDUCATION
AND TRAINING
SERIES
ReportNo. EDT61
SelectingtheBrightestfor Post-Secondary Educationin Colombia: TheImpactof Equity Emmanuel Jimenez Jee-Peng Tan
Public Disclosure Authorized
February1987 Education and Training Department
Operations Policy Staff
The viewspresented here are those of t-heauthor(s),and they should not be interpreted as reflectingthose of the World Bank.
Discussion Paper Education and Training Series Report No. EDT61
SELECTING THE BRIGHTEST FOR POST-SECONDARYEDUCATIONIN COLOMBIA: THE IMPACT ON EQUITY
Emmanuel Jimenez and Jee Peng Tan
ResearchDivision Education and Training Department
February 1987
The World Bank does not accept responsibilityfor the views expressed herein, which are those of the author(s) and should not be attributedto the World Bank or its affiliatedorganizations. The findings, interpretations,and conclusionsare the results of research or analysis supported by the Bank; they do not necessarilyrepresent official policy of the Bank. CopyrightC)1987 The InternationalBank for Reconstructionand Development/ The World Bank
ABSTRACT
Selection in post-secondaryeducation is highly competitivein many developingcountries. Ability is often an importantcriterion,but economic reasons may account for a bias against people from poor families. This paper uses Colombian data to examine the impact on equity if selection were based solely on ability. The resulting change indicates a significant increase in the share of lower income students at the expense of students from wealthier backgrounds. For such a shift to materialize,however, strengtheningthe availabilityof financial aid would be necessary to relieve economic constraintsbarring the access of bright students from poor families.
The commentsof George Psacharopoulosand Martin Carnoy on an earlier draft are gratefully acknowledged. Kyuee Ha Phak providedable research assistance. Partial funding was obtained from the World Bank Research Project 673-96.
In many developing countries,access to post-secondaryeducation is highly selective. The demand for this level of education is frequently very strong because of heavy public subsidization. However, not all qualified applicants can be accommodatedbecause budgetary constraints often limit the government'scapacity to expand the supply of places. The result is that in many of these countries,admission into post secondary education is rationed according to some selection criteria, such as examinationresults.
For various reasons, most systems of selection tend to discriminateagainst qualified students from poor families. In examination-basedsystems, for example, such studentsare at a disadvantage because their home environmentis seldom conducive to study, and they may not be able to afford additionalout-of-schoolinputs, such as private tutoring, to boost their scores. For most of them, repetition is not an affordableoption, so that even the most intelligentcandidatesare at a disadvantagebecause they are competing against others who have had the benefit of at least one more year of intellectualgrowth (Somerset 1974).
Self-selectionis another important reason why some high ability candidatesdo not enter higher education. The long queue for admission, and the fact that chances of being admitted are slim might discourage potential entrants from applying. The incidence of non-applicationis likely to be higher among people from poor families, because of the lack of financial resources to support further studies after secondary school. Even when tuition is free, the student still has to incur the cost of
-2-
forgone financial resources to support further studies after secondary school. Even when tuition is free, the student still has to incur the cost of forgone income. In the absence of educationalcredit, these students cannot finance their studies against future earnings. For this reason, even if some candidates from poor familiesdo apply and are selected, they may not be able to accept the offer.
If secondary-schoolgraduates who do not proceed into higher education are more qualified than some of the entrants, and if ability and education complementedeach other to determine a person's productivity, this result would be inefficient. The misallocationof resources across individualsarises because the returns to additionaleducationwould have been greater if selectionwere influencedprimarily by a person's aptitude rather than by his/her socio-economicbackground. This point has been demonstratedin a study by Pinera and Selowsky (1981), where the magnitude of the efficiencygains is presented through the use of simulation analysis.
The possible under-representation of qualified candidatesin the poor familiesalso has obvious adverse effects on equity. The purpose of this paper is to document the equity impact of reforming selection outcomes in Colombian higher education. The paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly reviews the analytical framework for assessing the extent to which a selection system discriminatesagainst high ability candidates. The results of applying this framework to data from Colombia are reported in the succeeding two sections.
An AnalyticalFramework
One way to evaluate the present selection criteria into Colombian post-secondaryeducation is to answer the following questions: If se:Lection were based solely on ability, how would the present enrollment patterns change? In particular,how many secondary school graduates who presently do not participatewould then enter higher education? How many poist-secondary studentswould lose their place to these new entrants?
The impact of a selection reform can be illustrated diagrammatically. In figure 1 (pre-reform),the distributionof ability scores for all secondary school graduates is marked as f. Only some in this pool of potential candidatescan afford the private cost of post-secondaryschooling. The distributionof academic ability of persons in this latter subset is marked as h in figure 1. Since we assume that incomes are uncorrelatedwith ability scores, distributionsf and h are centered around the same mean ability score -
point A.
Not all persons able and willing to pay for post-secondary education may in fact enter. In particular,if there is excess demand, selectionwould be restrictedto those meeting a minimum ability criterion, such as A1 in figure 1. Those selected are representedby the shaded area in figure 1. Their mean academic ability or aptitudewould be A2 (>A).
Frequency
Al
A
A.,
Ability
Figure 1
The likelihood that a high ability student does not enter post-secondary education depends on the extent to which factors other than ability matter in the choice for further education.
Referring to figure 1, this
probability is greater the greater the area between f and h.
If selection were based entirely on academic aptitude, some of the entrants to post secondary education would be replaced by more qualified persons.
The outcome of this new selection criterion is depicted
in figure 2 (post-reform). area II.
The displaced entrants are represented by
They are replaced by students represented by area III.
Those in
-5r eyhosen under
the prereforra selectiOn
of places in post-secondary are equal.
educi
The imean acadeemic
sysem.Since syste
s
post-secora after the selection e~eeducat2n in poNturallyar reform the pre-refo is indicatdb level Of aptitude dentu secondary along l education. eduation e
aptitudeoftudents
IC
I u Figure
2bilit 2
a
A
- 6 Data
The data for this analysis were originallycollectedunder the World Bank's study to evaluate diversifiedsecondary education (DiSCus project) in Colombia. The first round of data were raised in 1981 in a survey of final year secondary school students. Baseline informationwas gathered on each student's socioeconomicbackground,as well as his or her score on a battery of tests. Two types of tests were administered,one to measure mathematicaland verbal aptitude, and the other to measure achievementin subject areas, such as commerce, agricultureand technical knowledge. The aptitude tests "measure the student's innate mental ability, and hence, predict how well an individualmay learn" (Psacharopoulosand Loxley 1986). The studentswere followedup one year later, when informationbecame available about their work or study status after secondary school.
For the analysis here, we define two dichotomouspopulations: individualswho study full-timeor part-time in 1982 are categorizedas students; the other group consists of those who work full-timeafter graduatingfrom secondary school. The broad definitionof students is used here because it would highlight the importanceof factors other than ability in determining selectionoutcomes. The bias in selectionwould be more significant if a high ability person did not study at all, than when he or she studied part time.
Reforming Selection in the Overall System
Ability is assumed to be measured by the average score on the verbal and mathematics tests. The mean ability score of studentswas 51.74 percent, compared to 51.62 in the overall sample (table 1); these figures correspondto A2 and A respectivelyin figure 2 above. It is interesting to note that the range of the ability scores in both populationsis the same, suggesting that ability is not central to the present selection system.
Consider the effect of the following hypotheticalreform is then examined: Reform A: All students and non-studentsin the sample are ranked according to their average ability score. Keeping the total number of places in the system constant, a student is replaced if he/she scored less than the highest ranked person among the available pool of non-students.
How many present post-secondarystudentswould be replacedby secondary school graduates who are presently in the labor force? In the overall populationof 1479 students,841 or 56.9 percent would be replacedby new students of higher academic aptitude. An interestingpoint is that of the replacement students,nearly half (404 students) did not apply to enter any form of post-secondaryeducation. This implies that altering selection criteria used by higher level universitiesand other institutionswould not be sufficientto draw all high scoring individuals. Demand would also have to be stimulatedto convince them to apply.
The replacement of low ability studentswith high ability non-studentsin post-secondaryinstitutionswill affect average scores and the socio-economicprofile of the "new" student population. The results appear in table 1. After the hypotheticalreform, the ability score of the student population increases to 58.97 (A3 in figure 2), a rise of 14 percent. The reform does not change significantlythe proportionof entrants from public secondary schools.
The impact of the selection reform on the distributionof students by income group appears in the last six rows of table 1. Relativelyfew graduates of secondary schools come from the lower income groups. But the present system of selection into post-secondaryeducation worsens this bias. The proportionof students from the lowest two quintilesof the income distributionprofile is 22.7 (5.3 + 17.4) percent for the overall sample, compared to 20.7 (4.9 + 15.8) percent for the subsampleof students. On the other hand, the proportionfrom the highest two income groups is 53.8 for the overall sample and 57.5 percent for the student subsample.
Had selectionbeen based only on the ability score alone, the share of students from the lowest two income groups would have increased to 23.2 percent. This increase comes at the expense of a reduction in the share of those in the highest income quintile,whose share would decline from 24.4 to 21.7 percent. The percentage share of the middle 40-80 percent of the income distributionprofile remains virtually unchanged.
- 9 -
Table 1: Characteristicsof the Student PopulationBefore and After SelectionReform A-Colombia 1981 Secondary School Cohort
Studentsand Non-Students
StudentsOnly Before Reform After Reform A
Number in Sample
3494
1479
1479
Ability Score Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
51.62 7.95 26.00 77.00
51.74 7.70 26.00 77.00
58.97 4.59 53.00 77.00
Percent From Public Secondary Schools
76.7
76.9
75.6
Distributionof Students by Household Income Quintile (%)a/ 1 2 3 4 5
5.3 17.4 23.4 32.9 20.9
4.9 15.8 21.8 33.1 24.4
5.1 18.1 22.0 33.1 21.7
100.0
Total
Percent Female
47.4
100.0
48.5
100.0
41.0
a/ The income groups are the same as those in the 1978 Colombianurban income survey (Mohan, forthcoming).
If one accepts the hypothesisthat innate ability is uncorrelatedwith income, then the distributionof students across different income strata should be close to that of the overall sample (studentsplus non-students). This can be done by comparing the student profiles with the first column of the income distribution profiles of table 1. While the match is not perfect, the post-reform (relative to the pre-reform)profile is much closer to the overall sample profile.
The reform would also reduce the proportionof females in the student population-- from 49% to 41%. In selecting purely on the basis of ability, there
-
10
-
seems to be a trade-offbetween two equity goals: there is a more equitable share of student-placesfor the lowest 40% in the income distributionbut a proportionatelysmaller share of places for females. How can this be, if innate ability is equally distributedamong males and females? One possible explanationfor this result is the following. Among those who are less able, the private rate of return to schoolingmay be greater for females than for males. Opportunitycosts may be greater for males who are expected to be semi-independentof the family shortly after secondary school. However, the private rate of return differentialbetween males and females may lessen with ability. This could occur because for those with greater ability, the private cost differentialbetween males and females is not as important in the choice calculus. Opportunitycost effects would tend to be offset by the gain in expected earnings in determiningthe private rate of return, due to the complementaritybetween innate ability and education. If so, lower-abilityfemales would be overrepresentedin the pre-reformsubsample. The reform would then lead to a decline in the proportionof females in the student subsamples.
Reforming Selection by Type of Institution
The impact within each type of institutionof selectingby ability alone can be assessed by imposing the following reform: Reform B: Students in each type of institutionare ranked according to their ability score. Keeping the number of places in each institutionconstant, students are replaced by higher-scoringnon-students. We examine below the impact of Reform B in the universitiesand technical institutes,and in public and private higher education.
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13
-
Selection in Universitiesand Technical Institutes:
There are several types of higher education in Colombia, three of whiLchare distinguishedin the present data base: university, intermediate technical institutes,and other institutions(pre-universityor in-service training centers such as SENA).
The profile of the student body before reform is shown in the first two columns of table 2. There is great similaritybetween the two types of institutions: in the average ability score, in the proportionof students coming from public secondary schools, in the proportionof females, and in the distributionby income group.
Following Reform B, about three-quartersof the entrants to universities,and over 90 percent of the entrants to technical institutes would be replaced. In both cases, about half the replacementstudentsdid not apply to enter post-secondaryeducation. As before, the high rate of non-applicationindicates that self-selectionfor economic reasons might have been important in determiningwho eventuallyenters higher education.
The representationof graduates of public secondary schools,and that of females in both types of institutionswould decline as a result of the reform. Not surprisingly,the average ability score of the new student populationwould rise dramatically: by 19.5 percent in universities,and by 28.1 percent in technical institutes. The increase in mean ability score suggests that both universitiesand technical instituteshave difficulty in attracting the studentswith the best academic potential. But the problem is more severe in the technical institutes.
- 12 Table 2 also indicates that Reform B would change the composition of the student body by income groups.
In both universities and technical
institutes, it would shift enrollments in favor of the lower income groups.
Correspondingly, fewer students would come from the highest income
quintile after the selection reform.
These results show that there would
be more equity in the access to post secondary education if entry depended only on a student's aptitude score.
Table 2: Selection in Universitiesvs. Technical Institutes Before Reform Tech.Inst. Universities Number of Students
After Reform B Univ. Tech.Inst.
641
203
641
203
Ability Score Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
51.83 7.60 26.00 77.00
51.59 7.51 34.50 72.00
61.94 3.87 57.00 77.00
66.11 3.26 62.50 76.50
Percent From Public Secondary Schools
77.7
77.3
75.0
70.0
Percent Female
49.9
50.7
37.6
32.5
-
-
482
186
-
-
78.2 49.8
91.6 55.4
Replacement Students Number % of Total in Each Type of Institution % Non-applicant
Distribution of Students by Household Income Quintile 1 2 3 4 5 All Income Groups -:
not applicable
-
3.4 15.0 20.3 33.5 27.8
4.9 13.8 16.8 38.4 26.1
4.7 20.4 20.8 36.4 17.8
5.4 21.2 21.2 36.5 15.8
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
-
13
-
Selection in Private and Public Higher Education:
In Colombia, public higher education is highly subsidized. Fees charged to students are very low, constituting,on average, only 5% of overall income. In contrast, private higher education institutionsmust recover most (85% on average) of their costs through fee revenue (Reyes-Posada1986). Because of the differences in private costs, we should expect differences in the socio-economicprofiles of students in the two types of institutions.
The characteristicsof the student populationsbefore and after Reform B appear in table 3. Before the reform, the average ability scores of those who enter public institutionsof higher education are about the same as those who enter private institutions. There is also little difference in the percentageof these two groups who are female or who come from public secondary schools.
As expected, the lowest income quintilesof the populationare under-representedin the group entering private institutions. only 13.2% come from the bottom 40% of the population income distribution. Their share in enrollments is higher in public institutions,although the poorest income group is still under-represented: some 22% of all those going into public institutionscome from the bottom 40%.
Following Reform B, 78% of students in public institutionsand 87% of students in private institutionswould be replaced by higher ability non-students. The average ability score would increase by 20% in public institutionsand by 24% in private institutions. These results indicate that there would be fewer changes in public institutionsin Colombia than
-
14 -
private institutionsas a result of the selectionreform. However, the replacementrates and the increase in average ability are still significant in public institutions.
As a result of the reform, the proportionof public university students who belong to the poorest 40% of the populationwould rise slightly from 22.3% to 26.3%. The proportion from the richest 20% would remain virtually unchanged. The picture is very different in private institutions. The proportionof private university students from the poorest 40% of the income distributionwould almost double --
from 13.1% to
24.6%. At the same time, the proportion from the richest quintile would fall from 34.4% to 18%. These figures indicate that public universitiesin Colombia are more successfulthan private ones in attracting those with the highest ability, regardlessof income. On the other hand, private universitiescater to the richer income groups, even though they are not as able. This is not necessarilyan undesirableoutcome, as long as private universitiesare unsubsidized.
- 15 Table 3:
Selection in Public vs. Private Higher Level Institutions
Before Reform Public Private Number of Students
After Reform B Public Private
570
395
570
395
51.90 7.64 26.00 73.50
51.24 7.73 31.00 77.00
62.42 3.80 57.50 76.50
63.74 3.66 59.50 77.00
Percent From Public Secondary Schools
77.7
76.7
74.4
72.4
PlercentFemale
50.4
50.6
37.5
36.0
-
-
-
-
-
-
446 78.3 49.3
343 86.8 50.1
Ability
Score
Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
ReplacementStudents Number % of Total in sector % Non-Applicant
Distributionof Students by Household Income Quintile 1 2 3 4 5 All Income Groups -: means not applicable.
5.8 16.5 24.7 35.3 17.7
2.0 11.1 16.7 35.7 34.4
5.1 21.1 22.1 35.8 15.8
4.6 20.0 21.8 35.7 18.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
- 16 Conclusions
Previous work has shown that there could be substantial efficiencygains if ability, rather than willingness to pay private costs, determinedwhich secondary school graduates enter post-secondary education. This paper uses data from Colombia to measure the impact on equity if ability were the sole criterion that determinedselection.
The main conclusionis that individualsfrom lower socio-economic strata would gain from such a reform of the selectionmechanism. In particular, the proportionof students from the 20-40%ilewould rise, and that from the 80-100%ilewould decline. The proportionsfrom other income groups would remain roughly the same. This gain in equity is accompanied, however, with a decline in the proportionof females in the student subsample.
- 17 -
REFERENCES
Bray, M.
"High School Selection in Less Developed Countries and the Quest for Equity: ConflictingObjectivesand Opposing Pressures," ComparativeEducation Review, 29 (2): 216-31, 1985.
Heyneman, S. and Loxley, W., "The Effect of Primary-SchoolQuality on across 29 High- and Low-IncomeCountries,"American Journal of Sociology,88 (6): 1162-94, 1983. Mohan, Rakesh, Poverty, Income and Employment in a DevelopingMetropolis: Consequencesof Growth in Bogota and Cali, Colombia, Oxford UniversityPress, forthcoming. Pinera, S. and Selowsky,M., "The Optimal Ability-EducationMix and the Misallocationof Resources within Education,"Journal of DevelopmentEconomics, 8: 111-31, 1981. Psacharopoulos,G. and Loxley, W., Diversified SecondaryEducation and Development,Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UniversityPress, 1985. Reyes-Posada,Alvaro, "Ayudas Estudiantilespara Financiacionde la Educacion en Colombia: Perspectivaspara el Futuro," Ministerio de Educacion,Bogota, 1986. Somerset,H.C.A., "Who Goes to SecondarySchool? Relevance,Reliability and Equity in Secondary School Selection,"in Education,Society and Development,D. Court and D. Ghai (eds.), Nairobi: Oxford UniversityPress, 1984.
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FOOTNOTES
I/
Aside from Examinations,selection is sometimes determinedby setting quotas according to such characteristicsas gender, geographic residence,and ethnic origin. Such a system might select students with poor academic aptitudewhile rejecting others with higher aptitude (Bray 1985).
2J
Such a hypotheticalreform of the system has been suggested by Pierre and Selowsky (1981). However, their investigationfocused on efficiency issues and did not use actual data.
3/ For simplicity,the distributionin Figures 1 and 2 are depicted as normal around a mean. The normality assumptionis not essential to the results below. 4/ See Psacharopoulosand Loxley (1986) for a more detailed descriptionof the survey and data. 5/ These tests, based on Instituto Colombianopara el Fomento de la Educacion Superior (ICFES) aptitude tests administeredto students in secondary school ion 1981, were intended as measures of a person's innate mental proficiency. They are used to predict how well students may learn in whatever field they pursue. Thus, they differ from achievement tests that measure how much a student has learned in a given subject.
